Can you really know whether other people perceive the same reality as you do?

stern61 AT 🔍 Enthusiast 👁 130 ⚑ Report Philosophy

This has been on my mind for a long time: when I show someone a picture of a red car and they say it's red - how do I know they're seeing the same shade of red as I am? Or could their perception of 'red' look completely different from mine, but they still call it red anyway? Is there a philosophical answer to that?

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But how would you even verify that two people see the same color - even if you could look into their brain?

The problem is bigger than people think. The others are right that you can't know it objectively - but here's the tricky part: it practically doesn't matter at all. If your friend sees what you see at "red" when they look at "blue", and vice versa, but you both react consistently to the same objects and rules, then communication still works perfectly. You both don't drive off when the traffic light is red. That's enough for the reality we live in.

What the others are missing: this thought experiment applies just as much to everything else. You can never know if your perception of pain is like someone else's, whether music sounds different to you than to others, whether loneliness feels the same. It's not just a problem with colors. And yet the world works because we can agree on behavior and consequences, not on inner experience. Philosophically, it's more of a reason to probably have to accept that absolute certainty is impossible here - but also that it's not necessary for real life.

stern61 asker Thanks for the thoughtful answer! 🤔 That's exactly what I was missing - that it's basically not relevant as long as communication works. Somehow reassuring! 😊

That's the so-called qualia problem or inverted spectrum - and no, you can't objectively know it. Philosophers also call it "philosophical zombies" or the explanatory gap concept: even if someone says all the right words and behaves like someone who sees red, you could theoretically never look into their head and check whether the inner experience (the quale) is identical to yours. In practice, communication still works because we all have similar biological hardware and our perceptions generally behave consistently enough - but philosophically, the question is really unsolved and many thinkers think it's unsolvable in principle. It's simply an area where subjectivity and objectivity clash.

You actually can't know it, and philosophically speaking it's pretty much unsolvable - but there's a trap a lot of people fall into: they assume the problem *only* exists with colors. In reality it applies to every inner experience - pain, fear, what music feels like. Even if you could completely scan another person's brain, you'd still only have data, not direct access to their actual experience. But here's the wild part: in practice the world still works anyway, because we all react similarly to red cars, pain, or music - whether the inner experience is identical doesn't actually matter for how we live together.

Actually, that's less an unsolvable riddle and more a question that defeats itself - if two people display the same behaviors, describe the same things, and make the same decisions in the same situation, then the question of whether their inner experience is "really" identical becomes practically irrelevant. The point the others are missing: it's not about whether you *can* know it, but whether the distinction even makes sense. If there's no way to verify it, and it makes no practical difference - why should it be philosophically decisive?

Don't expect a simple answer here - this is actually a genuine rabbit hole you can fall down endlessly. The previous answers are right that you can't verify this objectively, but some of them make it more complicated than it needs to be.

The core problem is: even if we could map out the exact brain states of both people, it wouldn't change anything. You could see that the same neurons are firing, but know whether the subjective experience is identical? No. That's not "unsolvable" in the sense of "we're still researching it" - it's structurally impossible. Your perception of red is private, accessible only to you. Period.

But here's the important part: this fact doesn't make your life chaotic at all. In practice, communication works because we don't need identical perceptions - we need consistency. If the person you're talking to always calls red cars "red," always calls red traffic lights "red," and never calls green things "red," then it doesn't matter whether their inner experience is identical to yours. The structure fits, and that's enough. Many philosophers (and I do too) think the question "but could their red look different?" is actually a useless question - because "different" can't be tied to anything objective that you could verify.

The practical way out of the problem is that you don't actually need to know whether the inner experience is identical - as long as you agree on the same things and act accordingly. At my place, we once had a discussion about whether a particular wall color was "warm gray" or "cold beige" - we apparently see it differently, but we were able to agree that it works. The qualia problem theoretically remains, but it makes no practical difference because language and shared behavior create a stable bridge. It's still philosophically interesting, but it's more of a problem of knowledge than an actual barrier between people.

The qualia problem really is tricky, and the previous answers are right that you can't objectively verify it. But I'd go one step further: the whole thought experiment assumes there's something like a private, inner color perception that exists completely independently of language and behavior. But that itself is already a controversial assumption. When you try to describe your perception of red - "a warm, glowing red" - you're already using words that are tied to external things, not to your inner experience.

A real problem that often gets overlooked: you could live with someone your whole life, and you could still have different inner perceptions - but because you agree on *everything*, you never notice the difference. This isn't just about colors, but also about pain, music, taste. The practical consequence, though, is this: whether your counterpart really sees your red identically or has a completely different inner experience that they just call "red" - it doesn't matter at all for your life together. You can still communicate perfectly. Some philosophers argue for this reason that the question itself is kind of pointless, because the answer wouldn't be practically relevant to anything.

Have you ever tried describing your favorite color to someone without pointing at objects? For me it's always interesting - I show my friend a photo of a hillside in autumn and we agree it's "orange," but whether we're actually having the same sensation remains a mystery. The qualia problem doesn't go away no matter how much neuroscience we do.

But here's the practical thing: for our everyday life, it doesn't matter at all. Once we agree on colors, on how we describe objects, on how we react to them - then our shared reality works. Whether your inner experience of red is identical to mine, we can never prove, and philosophically that's completely fine. We don't need to be able to explain everything in order to function together.

When I talk to someone about a color, I quickly realize: we can only communicate through behavior and language, not through inner experience. The qualia problem can't be solved because your subjective feeling is fundamentally private - whether your "red" corresponds to my "red" remains unfalsifiable. What the previous answers overlook: this isn't even philosophically a major problem, it's more of a category mistake. You're asking for objective certainty about something that's subjective by definition. Practically, the world works anyway because we agree on common reactions and descriptions - whether exactly the same feeling is behind it is irrelevant.

The color nuances your eye perceives depend on your individual photoreceptors - and those actually differ from person to person. Some people have an extra type of cone cell and see more color nuances than average, others see fewer. That's biologically measurable. But that's exactly where objectivity ends, because you can never penetrate into another person's subjective experience - that's actually the qualia problem that the others brought up.

Here's the catch: You can check whether someone agrees with your words, whether they interpret traffic lights correctly, whether they react consistently to red throughout their entire life. But that tells you nothing about what it *feels like* when they see red. Theoretically, their inner experience could be completely inverted - their red is optically your green, but their brain is wired in such a way that they call it "red" and would pass all the tests. The problem can't be solved because consciousness isn't completely accessible from the outside.

In practice, though, it barely matters: You don't need to know what it feels like for others to communicate and live together with them. Shared language and common behavior are enough. It's a fascinating philosophical dead end, but not really a problem you have to "solve."

I find it interesting that several people here suggest it's unsolvable - but that's not quite right. The problem isn't actually whether you *can* know it, but that the question is poorly framed: If two people react identically to red, describe it the same way in sentences, artists paint with it the same way - then that IS factually the same perception, regardless of what subjectively happens "inside." You're confusing "I don't know other people's inner experience" with "I can't know whether we see the same thing" - those are two different problems. One is metaphysically unreachable, the other is just practically irrelevant.

If your counterpart says the car is red - do you really need to know whether their inner experience of redness is identical to yours? The others are right that you can't objectively verify that. That's the qualia problem, and it's a real thing. But here comes the key point that the previous answers somehow overlooked: the problem is completely irrelevant for practical communication.

Two people can have completely different inner color experiences and still live together perfectly well, because they show the same *reactions*. You classify traffic lights correctly, I do too - whether my subjective experience of red matches yours or not doesn't matter at all. Philosophy calls this "functionalism": as long as the function is right, the meaning and the behavior, the inner quality is philosophically irrelevant. That's not unsatisfying, it's just pragmatic.

The real problem sits elsewhere. It's not about colors - it's about whether your own conscious experience even exists or is just an illusion your brain creates. But that's a different thing entirely. Back to the original question: No, you don't know for sure. Yes, it could be. No, you don't care about it in real life.

I think you have to distinguish between two different questions here: Whether you can *know* that others have the same perception of red - I agree with the others on that, it's philosophically unsolvable and the qualia problem is real. But practically it's completely irrelevant whether your inner red looks different from mine, as long as we both point at red cars and agree on that 😄 The second answer makes a good point - even if you could look into someone's brain, you'd only see the physical processes, not the subjective experience. That's a different level of the problem. In the end, human communication works anyway, because we agree on behavior, descriptions and context - not on that mysterious inner experience.

One thing the others haven't really touched on: the problem partly dissolves if you accept that "perceiving reality" isn't the same as "sharing subjective sensory experience." Sure, you can never know how your counterpart *experiences* red, but you're still navigating the same objective world - the car is actually red, regardless of how it feels to each of you. The philosophical gap between "we see differently, but we're talking about the same objects" and "we don't share reality" is much smaller than it seems.

The crux of it is: you fundamentally can't verify it, because you'll never get into someone else's consciousness - but that doesn't actually make the question unsolvable, just kind of irrelevant for everyday life. If your buddy brakes at red the same way you do, pays attention to the same traffic lights, and talks with you about "that red car" without any confusion, then in practice it doesn't really matter what their inner experience looks like. The philosophers have a point that it stays a genuine problem, but it's less a puzzle that needs solving and more a boundary of what we can know about others - and we just have to live with that.

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